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JUSTICE WITHOUT JUSTICES
John 0. McGinnis*
My proposal for constitutional erasure is simply to eliminate
the position of Supreme Court Justice. This notion is not as
radical as it initially sounds. It would not stamp out judicial review, the supremacy of federal law, or even the Supreme Court
itself. If the separate office of Supreme Court Justice had not
been established, federal judges sitting on the inferior courts of
the United States could have been randomly assigned to the Supreme Court for short periods, such as six months or a year. In
the early republic, Supreme Court Justices themselves sat on
designated lower courts when they "rode circuit." Call my counterfactual universe "Supreme Court riding."
For now, assume that this universe would require an alteration of the Constitution, rather than a mere revision of jurisdictional statutes, though I will return briefly to that interesting issue below. Whatever means would be necessary to carry it out,
my proposal would efface a key provision of our received constitutional order. Why do it? I believe that judges should treat all
written law, including the Constitution, as a formal system of
rules to be objectively interpreted according to their original
meaning. Supreme Court Justices have too often proved incapable of engaging in this enterprise. The most disastrous decisions in the constitutional history of the United States-such as
2
Dred Scott/ Plessy, and Roe v. Wade 3 -have this in common: the
Justices employed a style of decision making that had more in
common with formulating a political platform or policy position
paper than with interpreting a legal text understood as a system
of rules.

* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. Thanks to Akhil Amar, John
Duffy, Michael Herz, Nelson Lund, Michael McConnell, Mark Movsesian, Michael
Rappaport, and Paul Shudack for helpful comments.
I. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
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The nature of the office itself has made such lapses almost
inevitable. Vested for life with the awesome power to make final decisions with wide-ranging consequences for the nation, Supreme Court Justices generally cannot help but come to see
themselves as statesmen rather than as humble arbitrators of legal disputes. Indeed, many of the mortals who have inhabited
the marble temple across from the Capitol have come to believe
that they have an even higher calling: to serve as priests of our
collective conscience and to preserve the nation's "very ability to
see itself though its constitutional ideals." 4
In contrast, judges who "rode" to the Supreme Court only
for a short time would have been more likely to treat constitutional issues and other momentous decisions more like the other
quotidian matters that they were accustomed to resolving in
their courts. Supreme Court riding would have lessened Justices' vested interest in the development of constitutional law according to some personal vision because they would have returned to their home courts to dine on a diet of mundane
commercial and criminal matters, as well as constitutional issues
for which they were not the final arbiters. The prospect of soon
returning to a professional life occupied with discovery disputes
and trials of accused drug dealers functions like the whisper of
the slave in the back of the triumphal chariot, who reminded the
Roman general of his mortal fallibility. Today's newspapers,
like the throngs of cheering Romans, perform the opposite role
by encouraging judges to overstep the law. The short term of
Supreme Court riders would make it easier to resist the urgings
of the Washington Post and New York Times to "grow in office."
Thus, the structure of the office of Supreme Court riders would
have been more likely to instill the habits of constrained judg5
ment contemplated by Federalist 78.
Supreme Court riding would also have had other good effects. It would have made the Court a less imperial (and imperious) presence in national life. Long ago, our own American
Brutus correctly predicted that the Supreme Court would consolidate power in the central government because the Justices
would have an interest in using interpretation to expand their
own powers and those of the government to which they be-

4.

Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. S33, 86..'l

(I 992).

5. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Ointon Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464,465
(Mentor, 1961) (Courts should have "'neither force nor will but merely judgment").
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longed. 6 Supreme Court riders, however, would not have been
long time residents of the nation's federal district and would thus
be more likely to retain a respect for the nation's constituent
states. The structure of the office would thus have militated
against the unjustifiable nationalizing tendencies that have often
marred the Court's jurisprudence.
A related benefit is that Supreme Court riders would have
not spent their lives in one of the world's most artificial cities-a
locale where the principal business is minding other people's
business. Simply by living in cities with a greater multiplicity of
enterprises and concerns, Supreme Court riders would at the
margin have been more sympathetic to market processes and
civil society.7 Thus, the elimination of the position of Supreme
Court Justice would have tempered one great tension inherent in
our original constitutional order: a Constitution dedicated to
preserving private and decentralized ordering has unfortunately
depended for its preservation on the decisions of governmental
actors employed by a centralized authority.
My counterfactual universe would have combined the advantages of term limits with those of life tenure. Federal judges
would have continued to enjoy the independence afforded by
life tenure because they would have returned to their home
courts, whatever decisions they made while on loan to the Supreme Court. But the sharp limits on their terms of supreme decision making would have improved some pathologies associated
with life tenure on the Supreme Court. It would have encouraged a circulation of jurists with fresh perspectives on legal issues and prevented the law from becoming the personal domain
of a few. It would also have curtailed the effects of senility and
the excessive delegation of power to young and energetic law
clerks by reducing the temptation to cling to the bench into very
old age.
The most important risk from term limits, in general, is that
an office holder will perform less responsibly to make a name for
himself in the short time available. While some jurists might
have used their short-time on the high court to seek fifteen min6. Brutus XI, reprinted in John P. Kaminskin and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., 15
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 516-17 (State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1984 ).
7. For similar reasons Professor Steven Calabresi has suggested that the Supreme
Court be moved to a location outside Washington. See Relimiting Congressional Power:
Should Congress Play a Role?, 12 L. & Pol. Rev. 627, 636 (1997) (remarks of Steven
Calabresi).
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utes of fame, I believe the risk from this would have been small.
New Justices have typically behaved for their first few years
much as they did as lower court judges. 8 It seems to take a while
to make the transition from a servant of the law to its master.
Some may argue that Supreme Court riding would have destabilized the Court, weakening the force of precedent and consequently the public's respect for its judgments. This critique
might have some force if we were to compare a court composed
of Supreme Court riders with one composed of judicial paragons. But the notion has little force if we compare my imagined
court with what has actually existed. That Supreme Court has
frequently overruled important decisions, often within a short
period, both with and without decisive changes in personnel. 9
The Court has even included Justices who stubbornly refused to
uphold the death penalty despite scores of contrary decisions by
their brethren. 10 Some Justices have candidly admitted that stare
decisis is simply a doctrine of convenience. 11 Others praise stare
decisis, but in important cases give it no effect. 12
When was the last time any Justice was publicly praised for
a career marked by fidelity to precedent, or criticized as a judicial innovator? Supreme Court Justices by virtue of their long
tenure can often move the law dramatically to their way of
thinking, and serious concern for precedent interferes with the
exercise of that power. In contrast, Supreme Court riders would
have been less able to instantiate their political vision and would
therefore be more likely to follow precedent. Moreover, because the riders would have come from inferior courts, which
operate under the threat of reversal, they would have had more
practice in following precedent. Lower court judges are frequently praised in testimonials and memorials for being infrequently reversed. The raw power that was briefly theirs while
riding to the Supreme Court would seldom have had much affect

8. Of course, some individual lower court judges have always rendered outlandish
judgments, but they would have had less ability to affect the decisions of nine-member
court than their own trial court or a panel of three.
9. The most notorious example is Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
which itself overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).
10. See Clifton S. Elgarten, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 19 Cardozo
L. Rev. 817, 817-19 (1997) (praising the refusal of Justices Brennan and Marshall to accede to stare decisis in the death penalty).
II. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401,403 (1988).
12. See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949).
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on their overall reputation, except perhaps negatively if they
seemed to get carried away with themselves while on the Supreme Court.
Another possible objection is that Supreme Court riders
would have been less capable jurists than Supreme Court Justices. This objection seems to have force only if we assume what
I deny: that the Supreme Court should be an arena for statesmen
or demi-gods. The variation in legal ability that now exists
within the federal judiciary is relatively small, perhaps smaller
than what exists within the Supreme Court itself. What distinguishes the Justices as a group from other federal judges is not so
much their talent as the luck and the political skills that got them
onto the high court, along with the grandiose aura that accompanies their greatly enhanced power. Requiring the Supreme
Court's work to be done by ordinary judges would make it more
likely that they would only do the Court's proper work.
Some might argue that the system would have been defective in that judges would not have remained to decide the merits
of most cases for which they had granted certiorari. I count that
as yet another virtue of Supreme Court riding. Judges would
have generally granted certiorari without knowing the identity of
the case's ultimate decision makers. This veil of ignorance
would discourage strategic behavior, thus strengthening the rule
of law.
It is possible that some forms of Supreme Court riding
could be implemented within the constitutional universe we already inhabit. The Constitution provides: "The Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices, during
good Behavior. ... " 13 The most natural reading may require (and
the Framers certainly expected) judges to be appointed to a distinct Supreme Court, but the language is ambiguous. Moreover,
the early Supreme Court Justices who rode circuit sat as members of inferior courts and thus our early traditions suggest that
the inferior courts and the Supreme Court did not have to possess completely separate personnel. Even today, retired Justices
sometimes sit by designation on courts to which they were never
appointed, as do many district and circuit judges. The Constitution does, however, contemplate the office of Chief Justice/ 4 and

13. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 1.
14. Sec U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside").
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it is more likely that a judge must hold this specific appointment
during "good behavior."
However far one might go by statute in the direction of my
proposal, it would have been better for the Constitution to provide expressly for Supreme Court riding. If statutory Supreme
Court riding had been adopted and had proved superior to our
current system in curbing the Supreme Court's nationalizing
tendencies, interest groups that generally benefit from eviscerating the restraints of federalism would have tried to amend the
15
statute. Moreover, the President and a Congress of one party
might have been tempted to create the position of Supreme
Court Justice instead of Supreme Court rider to give more
power to their prospective appointees. Foreclosing the creation
of Supreme Court Justices through constitutional language
would therefore have been the wisest course.
A constitutional provision to carry out circuit riding might
have read something like this: "The Supreme Court shall be constituted in such a manner as Congress may by law require from
among the judges of the inferior courts: provided, however, that
assignments for terms of equal length not exceeding two years
shall be made randomly from among appellate courts or courts
16
of first instance, or both." That would have allowed Congress
to decide important issues whose optimal treatment might
change over the course of the nation's history, such as whether
to use only appellate judges as opposed to trial judges, whether
to have staggered terms, and exactly how long those terms
should be. On the other hand the requirement of randomness
would have prevented Congress from manipulating the system to
obtain the selection of its preferred judges.
In creating an alternate universe by eliminating an office
rather than by eliminating a particular event or person, I am
guided by the spirit of the Framers. The Framers recognized
that while we can never know the particular problems of the future, we can grasp man's enduring nature and invent political
15. For a discussion of the manner in which interest groups eviscerate sound con·
stitutional restraints, see John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority
Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 365,394-96 (1999).
16. The optimal constitutional provision might well also have permitted Congress
to choose state supreme court judges on a random basis to ride to the Supreme Court.
Their service would create yet another force for preserving federalism. The option of
employing state supreme court judges would also have preserved Congress' option of
declining to create interior federal courts. See U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1 ("The judicial
powt:r of the United States shall be v~:sted ... in such interior courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
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machinery that turns the inputs of that nature and our particular
environment into the output of good government. In my view,
Supreme Court riding should have been made part of our constitutional machine because it would have better channeled the
ambition of our judges into enforcing the rule of law appropriate
for the limited and decentralized government that the rest of the
Constitution contemplated.

